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Introduction
This thesis examines the uses of St. Alexander Nevsky’s iconography in the memory
vehicles constructed during the reign of Vladimir Putin to legitimize his political regime. In
particular, I am looking at a film invoking St. Alexander Nevsky produced during Putin’s early
rule along with a monument dedicated to Nevsky unveiled on the eve of the war against Ukraine.
I draw my theoretical framework from the works of Alon Confino, Nina Tumarkin, Stephen
Norris, Scott Palmer, and Mariëlle Wijermars. Specifically, I am interested in how political
leadership legitimates itself via such memory vehicles as film and monumental sculpture.
My two case studies are Vladimir Khotinenko’s film Pop (The Priest 2009) and the
statuary, Alexander Nevsky and His Retinue, constructed by Vitaly Shanov. Both the film and
the monument were sponsored by the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian government,
but each presents a different facet to the larger narrative of Alexander Nevsky. In the film,
Alexander Nevsky is one of the inspirations for the priest-protagonist who is presented as a
pacificist spiritual leader seeking to use soft power in order to overcome the Nazis and the
Soviets. Personified in the protagonist of the film, Nevsky stands for a diplomat seeking to create
a safe space for Russian Orthodox Christians to worship and exist as a community, whether that
be under the Soviets or the Nazis.
In my second case of the monument and, most importantly, the media coverage of its
unveiling, the idea of soft power is nowhere to be found. Now, Alexander Nevsky is presented as
a warrior-saint who defeated the West. There is little to no mention of Nevsky’s diplomacy as
this is no longer important in Putin’s narrative. While the tale of Nevsky working to create a
space for Russian Orthodox Christians continues to be used, it is given a new spin. Nevsky is
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represented in this narrative as returning victorious after defeating the “evil” Catholics (read: the
West), thus maintaining and expanding the safe space for the Russian Orthodox community.
While the monument itself does not say this anywhere on it, the media coverage explicitly does,
which is all that matters. The media coverage is what makes the monument since it is unlikely
that the majority of Russians will ever be able to visit it due to its secluded location on the border
with Estonia.
In Chapter One, I discuss how we know of Alexander Nevsky along with how he was
remembered during the Russian Empire and during the Soviet Union. Using the Second Pskovian
Chronicle, I explain what recorded history we have of Nevsky and how this history was
influenced by the authors’ need to include biblical references as the tale is hagiographic.
Following this, I move into discussing the development of Nevsky from the time of Ivan the
Terrible up to that of Vladimir Putin. Frithjof Benjamin Schenk has described several stages of
the memorialization of Nevsky, and I focus in particular on “sacralisation (thirteenth–fifteenth
centuries), russification (fifteenth– seventeenth centuries), stateification (eighteenth century),
nationalisation (nineteenth century), dethronement (1917–1937), recruitment (1939–1945),
consolidation and criticism (1945–1985).”1 This chapter looks at each of the phases, with a
particular focus on russification, dethronement, and recruitment. While Schenk ends in 2000
with what he calls a period of “pluralisation (1985-2000),” I add two additional phases,
diplomacy which began in 2009 and ended in 2014, and bellicosity which began in 2014 and
persists to this day.2
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Mariëlle Wijermars, Memory Politics in Contemporary Russia: Television, Cinema and the State (Oxfordshire:
Routledge, 2018), 79.
2
Wijermars, Memory Politics in Contemporary Russia, 79.
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In Chapter Two, I take a deeper look into the first phase, diplomacy, with the film The
Priest. The film depicts a Russian Orthodox priest, Father Alexander, under the Nazi occupation
in the Pskov region in Latvia who attempts to use diplomacy to allow his Church to remain open
and to continue serving those in his community, whether they be Soviets or Nazis. There are
multiple references to Alexander Nevsky throughout the film, including Sergei Eisenstein’s film,
Alexander Nevsky (1938), the church being named after Nevsky, the setting in Pskov near where
the “Battle on Ice” occurred, and, most importantly, the name of the protagonist himself.
Released in 2009, the film was sponsored by both church and state as part of the larger message
of Nevsky as a diplomat. It was only later, during Putin’s third and fourth terms, that the idea of
Nevsky as a diplomat transformed into a bellicose idea.
In Chapter Three, I use the monument, Alexander Nevsky and His Retinue, and the media
coverage to examine how Alexander Nevsky is portrayed as a warrior saint. The monument,
located on the border between Russia and Estonia, is not easily accessible, thus making the
media coverage all the more important. By looking at how Putin, the Patriarch, Metropolitan
Tikhon, and others explain the meaning of the monument, the phase of bellicosity in the
memorialization of Nevsky is clearly seen. In particular, this chapter looks at who exactly was
involved in the creation of the monument, what is carved and muraled onto the monument, and
what is reflected onto both Church and state by the monument.

Chapter One
According to medieval sources, Alexander Nevsky, born in 1221, served as the Prince of
Novgorod and later Grand Prince of Kiev and Vladimir. Historians know about the prince
primarily from the Second Pskovian Chronicle, above all from the hagiographic military tale
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“Tale of the Life and Courage of the Pious and Great Prince Alexander.”3 The author of this tale,
scholars believe, was “one of the warriors of his [Alexander Nevsky] household who witnessed
Alexander’s last years of his life.”4 The original anonymous author follows many of the stories
written about Byzantine knights of the time, specifically “The Deeds of Digenes Akrites.”5 In
1280, a priest from Vladimir edited the original story, adding in biblical references to draw
comparisons between the life of Nevsky and the lives of heroes within the Bible.6 Byzantine
heroes were no longer referenced but were replaced by biblical heroes.7
What is unique about this tale, or vita, is that Nevsky is “not necessarily a man
distinguished by an exemplary Christian life but, rather, the defender of his ‘holy’ nation against
invaders of alien faiths.”8 Leaders across the time of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and
the current Russian Federation took advantage of this difference and used Nevsky in a way that
other saints are not. During the time of the Soviet Union, especially, the figure of Nevsky as a
warrior was employed, and his faith was to be excluded almost entirely. With regard to alien
faiths, the Soviets applied this to Western ideologies and presented the Soviet people as
defenders against their pernicious influence. This argument reappears today in the speeches of
Vladimir Putin and his advisors on military and spiritual history as well. What accounts for the
longevity of the tale of Alexander Nevsky over the course of the past 800 years is the story’s
claim that Russia is a holy community in need of being defended against foreign ideologies and,
obviously, unholy ideologies.
3

“Tale of the Life and Courage of the Pious and Great Prince Alexander [Nevsky],” in Medieval Russia’s Epics,
Chronicles, and Tales, ed. Serge A. Zenkovsky (New York: Meridian, 1974).
4
“Tale of the Life and Courage,” 224.
5
“Tale of the Life and Courage,” 224.
6
“Tale of the Life and Courage,” 225.
7
“Tale of the Life and Courage,” 225.
8
“Tale of the Life and Courage,” 225.
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Within the tale itself, there are many lines which are drawn straight from the Bible, and
Alexander Nevsky is presented as the most pious of those around him. The authors compare him
to Joseph, who saved the Israelites from starvation, to Samson, one of the Israelite judges, and to
Solomon, whose wisdom was renowned throughout the ancient world. Before entering every
battle, Nevsky is depicted as praying to God for assistance, encouraging his men with the words
of David who said, “‘we called the Lord God to our help and they were defeated and fell, but we
got up and stood straight.’”9 As all of the battles written about within the tale are victories for
Nevsky and his retinue, the author leads one to believe that God was always on the side of
Nevsky. His piety and dedication to the Christian God were what kept Russia safe from those in
the West who sought to impose their alien “Roman” ways onto the Russian people.
Many of the events described within the vita focus on Nevsky’s victories over what we
now would consider Western powers, but there is reference to Nevsky’s relationship with his
Mongol overlords of the time. The authors describe how the Mongol people, when hearing that
Nevsky was traveling to visit the Khan, were scared, frightening their children by saying
“‘Alexander the Prince is coming.’”10
According to the chronicles, Nevsky distinguished himself in battles against the Livonian
Order, a group of knights that served as part of the Teutonic Order. First in 1240 and then again
in 1242, Nevsky defeated these knights and protected the city of Novgorod. His most famous
battle, the “Battle on Ice”, took place along Lake Peipus on the border between modern-day
Estonia and Russia. Recently, to celebrate the 800th birthday of Alexander Nevsky, a statue of
him and his men has been installed near Lake Peipus (called by Russians the Chudskoe Ozero).

9
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Beyond simply being a warrior, Nevsky was also a politician who worked closely
alongside the Mongols who ruled Rus’ as part of their large empire. Using the support of the
Mongols to his advantage, Nevsky removed some of his opponents from power, but he lacked
the power to challenge the Mongols as the rulers of Rus’. According to Aboltins and Anderson,
Nevsky considered Catholicism to be a larger issue at the time than the Mongols, and he used the
Mongols to prevent the spread of Catholicism. In return, Nevsky was dedicated to ensuring that
the Mongols received their tribute from Rus’ to the point that he used the threat of force to
ensure the Novgordoians followed Mongol rule. In 1259, he went so far as to “punish the people
of Novgorod for resisting Mongol tax-collectors.”11 This collaboration with the Mongols in
order to protect the Russian people is later indirectly invoked in The Priest by the character of
Father Alexander who sought to protect the Russian people while having to work with the Nazis
at the same time.
In the fourteenth century, Ivan the Terrible positioned Nevsky as the “founding father” of
the Riurik dynasty to create a geneology for the state of Muscovy and to tie himself back to a
well-known defender of the state and the faith.12 Around the same time, the Russian Orthodox
Church affirmed the status of Nevsky as a saintly figure which was “definitively established with
his canonisation…in 1547.”13 Thus, according to Wijermars, “a two-pronged cultural memory
was formed, encompassing a religious and a state-oriented component.”14 From this point
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Artis Aboltins and Erich Anderson, “Controversial Hero: The Reign of Alexander Nevsky,” Medieval Warfare 4,
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forward, political leaders across time used either one or both prongs to shore up support for the
regime and thus strengthen it.
After Peter the Great came to power, he came up with an idea to introduce the Order of
St. Alexander Nevsky as part of the larger cult of Nevsky as the guardian saint of the Russian
Empire. Peter the Great chose Alexander Nevsky, both a strong military figure and diplomat, off
of which to base the legitimacy of himself and of his newly created empire. The tsar sought to
bring Russia both militarily and diplomatically into the club of 18th century great powers, and he
recognized that Alexander Nevsky was the strong ruler who did the same in his time.
Furthermore, while Peter the Great sought to limit the power of the Church by establishing a lay
leader as head, he made the wise choice to choose an Orthodox saint to establish his empire’s
legitimacy. In 1724, Peter the Great moved Nevsky’s remains from Vladimir to his new capital,
St. Petersburg, and had it installed at the Alexander Nevsky Lavra,15 which sits at the top of
Nevsky Prospekt.16
After moving Nevsky’s remains, Peter the Great established a “day of memory of the
saint” on September 10, using the Gregorian calendar, or August 30, if using the Julian calendar
as the Russian Orthodox Church does.17 This became the second holiday to celebrate Nevsky,

15

Viktor V. Kvadri and Konstantin G. Konarzhevsky, “The Order of St. Alexander Nevsky Established,” in Russian
Imperial and Tsarist Orders, (St. Petersburg: Pyotr P. Soikin, 1901).
16
The Lavra, or monastery, sits at the top of Nevsky Prospekt, the central street of the city. The street plays a large
role in Russian cultural history, above all in literature, with Nikolai Gogol, Fedor Dostoevsky, and Andrei Belyi
invoking it in their stories and novels. Later, Nevsky Prospekt led to the Moscow-Petersburg express train terminal,
making the street a symbol of modernity. Nevsky Prospekt came to symbolize the two sides of Russia, the past and
the future. Along the street, churches were established by the state to recognize the victories of the Russian Army in
battle, showcasing the power of the state. Nevertheless, the street also came to symbolize, through literature, a place
where people of all different classes came together and mingled. In literature, Nevsky Prospekt came to be a place
where the state was not present and where the rules of society were more flexible. However, once an individual left
the street, the state returned as an omnipresent being which one could not escape.
17
Kvadri and Konarzhevsky, “The Order of St. Alexander Nevsky Established.”
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following his principal feast day on December 6/November 23.18 These two holidays were
recognized throughout the time of the Russian Empire and began being celebrated more widely
again after the fall of the Soviet Union.
After the October Revolution in 1917, the Order of St. Alexander Nevsky, established
following the death of Peter the Great, was abolished, due to its association with both the
Russian Orthodox Church and the former imperial government.19 As part of the Great Patriotic
War effort,20 Stalin re-established the Order of Alexander Nevsky in 1942, awarding military
commanders who “had demonstrated courage and contributed to the successful actions of their
units”.21 The appearance of the medal was changed from the medal previously used during the
time of the Empire. As can be seen in the image below, the medal no longer had the double
headed eagle which had been the symbol of the empire. Instead, in a somewhat eclectic fashion,
the title of Saint was replaced with symbols of the Soviet Union and of the Red Army.

18

“Monday December 6, 2021/November 23, 2021,” Orthodox Calendar, Holy Trinity Russian Orthodox Church,
accessed April 14, 2022, https://www.holytrinityorthodox.com/htc/orthodox-calendar/.
19
Kvadri and Konarzhevsky, “The Order of St. Alexander Nevsky Established.” Beyond simply a holiday, Peter
the Great wanted to establish the Order of St. Alexander Nevsky, intending it to be an “exclusively military award”.
He passed away before accomplishing this, though, and Catherine I, following his testament, was the one to create
the Order of St. Alexander Nevsky, awarding it to both military and civil servants. The Order was given out by
emperors and empresses until the fall of the Empire, with men such as General Mikhail Kutuzov, who defeated
Napoleon, and Ivan Shuvalov, the first Minister of Education and one of the founders of Moscow State University,
receiving it. In all, the Order was given out over 1,500 times to both military and civil servants to recognize “battle
services and state services”.
20
While known in the West as World War II, the Soviet Union titled this war the “Great Patriotic War” to allude to
the Patriotic War, the invasion of Russia by Napoleon and his French forces. The Patriotic War was a rallying time
for the Russian people as they came together and managed to defeat Napoleon and his stronger forces, pushing them
out of Russia and following them back to France. When looking for a rallying point to tie the Soviet people together
in defense against the Nazis, Stalin and his men recognized that the Patriotic War was the best choice. Just as the
Patriotic War required great suffering on the part of the Russians to defeat the French, the Great Patriotic War
required great suffering on the part of the Soviets to defeat the Nazis.
21
Kvadri and Konarzhevsky, “The Order of St. Alexander Nevsky Established.”
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Figure 1. Будовская библиотека, Орден Александра Невского, slide, Calameo, 2021,
https://en.calameo.com/books/00451518671bf012cae88. This image depicts the evolution of the
Order of Alexander Nevsky. On the far left is the medal from the Russian Empire. In the middle
is the medal from the Soviet Union. On the far right is the medal from the current-day Russian
Federation.
Alongside the literal battlefields of the Great Patriotic War were the cultural battlefields
on which the Nazis and the Soviets fought, seeking to get the upper hand in the fight for Russian
hearts and minds. Both the Nazis and the Soviets recognized that religion, particularly Russian
Orthodox Christianity, was to be a determining factor in winning over the Russian people. As the
Nazis continued to occupy more Soviet territory, they began to reopen Orthodox Churches,
causing people in the region to wonder whether life was to be better under the Nazis than under
the Soviets. Hearing of these reopenings and the people’s response to them, Stalin also decided
to reopen the churches as part of the war effort. With this, he was able to gain the support of
Church leaders who used sermons to speak out in favor of the Soviet government and worked to
gather supplies for those on the front. By getting the Church on their side, Stalin’s leadership
proved victorious in this cultural war between the Nazis and the Soviets.
The reinstatement of the Russian Orthodox Church was not the only way the Soviet
government used culture, though, to gain the support of the people. The Soviet government also

10

used cinema which portrayed, in clear terms, a message of support for the Soviet war effort and
against the Nazis. Made in 1938 and directed by Sergei Eisenstein, Alexander Nevsky, was
shelved in 1939 after Stalin signed the pact with Hitler, and it was only in 1941 that the film was
rereleased as part of the war effort against the Nazis. The film depicts the aforementioned
famous “Battle on Ice'' during which the Russians defeat the Teutonic Knights, referred to in the
film as Germans, by fighting them on an iced-over lake, causing the heavier Germans to sink.
The true purpose of the film, though, is to serve as a propaganda vehicle for Stalin’s government.
For Eisenstein, there is little history on the person of Alexander Nevsky which meant he could
have Nevsky say whatever the filmmaker wanted him to say. In this case, Nevsky served as the
mouthpiece for Stalinist propaganda, preaching the message of authoritarian rule over any other
form of government, the masses over the individual, and the strength of Russia over all other
nations. The Teutonic Knights in the film stand in as the Nazis with their flags bearing the
Germanic symbol of the eagle and swastikas invoking Nazi iconography.

Figures 2 and 3. “German knights standing alongside the flag,” Sergei Eisenstein, Alexander
Nevsky, 1939. “German priest,” Sergei Eisenstein, Alexander Nevsky, 1939. The image on the
left depicts the Teutonic Knights of Alexander Nevsky along with their flag. Note the similarities
between the eagle on their flag and the eagle used on German insignia. On the right, the image
depicts the German priest from Alexander Nevsky. Note the swastikas on his miter.
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While the plotline of the film centers around a 13th century battle, the underlying
message, obvious to viewers, is the strength of the Soviets over their Nazi enemies. The film was
incredibly popular leading up to the war but stopped being shown after the signing of the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939, a non-aggression pact signed between the Nazis and the
Soviets.
Following the end of the war, Stalin and the Soviet government erased the MolotovRibbentrop Pact from the historical narrative of the Great Patriotic War, replacing it with a story
of Soviet leadership and martyrdom. There was no mention of any of the losses during the first
two years of the war as Soviet leadership, according to their accounts, always made the right
choices to ensure the defeat of the Nazis. In terms of the large number of those who were killed,
they became martyrs in the fight against Nazism. This legacy of martyrdom was used throughout
the time of the Soviet Union to bolster the legitimacy of the regime and continues to be used
today by Putin and his government.
While Stalin allowed the Church to continue to function following the end of the Great
Patriotic War, leaders following him, particularly Nikita Khrushchev, began to persecute the
Russian Orthodox Church, accusing them of having worked with the Nazis during the war.
While this was the case for some of the occupied regions, Khrushchev and his government
expanded it to include all churches, seemingly forgetting that it was Stalin and his leadership
who reopened many of them. It was only when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power that the
repression of the Russian Orthodox Church was loosened and that leadership within the Church
began to change the narrative of the church’s role in the Great Patriotic War.
Just prior to the fall of the USSR, Nevsky’s body was returned to the Alexander Nevsky
Monastery in St. Petersburg from the Museum of Atheism and Religion (currently Kazan
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Cathedral).22 As part of perestroika and glasnost, Gorbachev’s movement to restructure and open
Soviet society, restrictions on the Russian Orthodox Church were eased, allowing those who
practiced Russian Orthodoxy to celebrate the 1000th anniversary of baptism of Kievan Rus’ in
1988 and the return of Nevsky’s remains to the monastery in 1989.
Today, in the Russian Federation, the Church and its priests are always discussed as
having made the right choice, assisting the soldiers, partisans, and everyday people in their
mission to restore the Soviet Union to power. To justify the support of the reopening of churches
under the Nazis, the current government and Church present the priests under the Nazi
occupation as having worked to undermine the Nazi rule and having supported the Soviet
soldiers and government. The Church is depicted as always working to restore the Soviet
government, preaching the message to fight against the Nazis and to donate materials to support
the Red Army. While the Church may remark upon the oppression they experienced under the
Soviet regime, their message on the Great Patriotic War consistently focuses on how the Church
was an ally to the regime during the war and how this period was a glorious time in Russian
history as it brought all Russians together.
With the restoration of the Church under the Russian Federation, leaders of the Church
have sought to impose the idea of symphonia on church-state relations to increase the power of
the Church in all spheres. Symphonia, according to Irina Papkova, is meant to be when “secular
and ecclesial power work together toward common goals” but is often interpreted as “efforts to
make all state policy conform to Christian standards.”23 In short, symphonia “places the Church
22

Wijermars, Memory Politics in Contemporary Russia, 80.
, Sonja Luehrmann, “The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics.” History of Religions 52 no. 4 (2013): 426–29.
doi:10.1086/669656.
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on equal footing with the state.”24 In practice, for the Church, symphonia would mean “close
cooperation with the state, yet without state interference in the ROC’s internal affairs.”25 It
should be emphasized, as Wijermars does, that this ideal has never been achieved. In Putin’s
state, the Church and state appear to be aligned on certain issues, especially under the leadership
of Patriarch Kirill. In more recent years, the state has shown a more significant degree of
willingness to adhere to the Church’s concerns, “for instance by responding to calls to intervene
in cultural matters on the grounds that feelings of religious people have purportedly been
violated.”26 As well, the state has been willing to allow the Church to include itself in Russia’s
sphere of influence abroad, particularly when defining the “Near Abroad”. Beyond simply
“linguistic and ethnic categories…, the (Russian) Orthodox religion could now function as a
marker of association, suggesting the existence of an intrinsic connection between Russia and
Orthodox believers worldwide.”27 Nevertheless, the state does retain control over the Church in a
kind of “asymmetric symphonia” in which the “Church’s limited political leverage reflects the
state’s perception of the ROC’s measure of societal authority.”28
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation kept the Order of
Alexander Nevsky, simply removing Soviet from the title. Similarly to the Order under the
Russian Empire, the current-day Order is awarded to military personnel, civil servants, and
foreign leaders. The most current recipient of the Order is Alexander Ginstburg, an academician
who developed the Sputnik V vaccine against COVID-19. Other recipients include Patriarch
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Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church, Alexander Lukashenko, leader of Belarus, and Alexander
Vucic, president of Serbia.

Chapter Two
In this chapter, I discuss Vladimir Khotinenko’s film The Priest as a memory vehicle examining
the Pskov Orthodox Mission and how the Mission’s story is integrated into the Putin-era official
narrative of the Great Patriotic War. My particular focus is the integration of the role of the
Russian Orthodox Church in the victory narrative as the origin story for the Putin regime.
The film depicts the life of a fictional character, Alexander Ionin, a Russian Orthodox
priest who serves the Church during the Nazi occupation of the USSR. Father Alexander is
presented as a pious man who, while taking the Nazis up on their offer to reopen the church in
his area, does not collaborate with the Nazis and instead works to assist his fellow Soviets
throughout the film. Going beyond simply serving the Soviet people, though, Father Alexander
serves the Christian God, and his actions throughout the film are represented as always serving
this higher power. Those around Father Alexander are part of this mission to serve God, and their
relationship with the priest makes them better people even if they do not embrace the Orthodox
Christian faith entirely.
It should come as no surprise, then, that, when thinking about the message which the film
seeks to promote, the Russian Orthodox Church commissioned the picture with the Russian
government and with Gazprom, a Russian state-owned energy company, both serving as
generous financial backers of the project. Both the Church and the state produce a usable past to
boost their legitimacy and the story of World War II. This story is, without an exaggeration, the
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founding myth for the official post-Soviet Orthodox Church and the state that took shape under
Vladimir Putin’s leadership.
The Orthodox Mission in the Liberated Regions, more commonly known as the Pskov
Orthodox Mission, started in 1941 at the behest of Metropolitan Sergii (Voskresenskii).29
Serving as the exarch of all the Baltic states, Sergii was a devout disciple of Metropolitan Sergii
(Stragorodskii), de facto leader of the Russian Orthodox Church from 1925-43 and Patriarch
from 1943 until his death in 1944.30 Arrested earlier by the German occupation authorities, Sergii
Voskresenskii was released four days later after having convinced the Germans that they would
be better off working with him, as a representative of the Moscow Patriarchate, than attempting
to revive the Latvian and Estonian Orthodox Churches.31 Furthermore, Sergii claimed, the
Moscow Patriarchate had never truly worked alongside the Communist regime of the USSR.32
German commanders seemed to believe Sergii, and he received approval from the Army Group
North to send an Orthodox mission to northwest Russia.33 Fourteen priests were sent as part of
this first mission.34 While Soviet historians referred to the mission as a propaganda effort on the
part of the Germans, Enstad contends that there was a genuine grassroots demand for the revival
of the church in northeastern Russia, which was met by German occupation authorities (472).
The Mission built an infrastructure of 220 churches and several workshops, including an icon-
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painting studio, chandlery, church paraphernalia store and construction shop, in the region.
Moreover, the Mission opened schools for parishioners, trained and ordained new priests, opened
an orphanage, and ran a charity campaign to help prisoners of war (POWs). Scholars argue
about the politics of the mission: some (not surprisingly many Soviet historians) claim that the
priests of the mission were Nazi collaborators; others, including Enstad, contend that the priests
performed a difficult balancing act between complicity in the occupying forces’ policies and
preservation of moral integrity and autonomy from the Nazi authorities (478).
One of the first priests to arrive with the Pskov Orthodox Mission was Aleksii Ionov
who, after the war, published memoirs about his work in the Mission. In 2009, Vladimir
Khotinenko used Ionov’s book as the basis for his film Pop (The Priest, dir. Vladimir
Khotinenko 2009).35 While the protagonist in the film, Father Alexander, does not share the
same name as Ionov, this is for good reason. According to the creators of the film, Father
Alexander is meant to resemble Ionov while at the same time drawing comparison to another
defender of the Church and Russian people, Saint Alexander Nevsky.
Similarly to Nevsky, the real Father Ionov and his work as a diplomat between the Nazis
and the Soviets served as material for Father Alexander in The Priest. While serving under the
Mission, Father Ionov worked with the Nazi occupiers to have Scripture taught in schools. He
managed to convince the Nazis “that the Russian people had always been -- and still remained -religious,” tying back to the argument made by Sergii Voskresenskii. Both Voskresenskii and
Father Ionov sought to prove to the Nazi occupiers that the Church had never worked with the
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USSR and that the Russian people had remained Christian despite attempts made by the Soviets
to eradicate all religion.
At the same time that Father Ionov was working to get Scriptures taught, he was also
organizing a “Russian Red Cross'' which worked to improve the lives of Soviet POWs in German
camps. In the film, even when the Germans protested this assistance, the priests continued to
help the Soviet POWs. At the same time, though, this benefitted the Nazi occupiers as it
provided them with a healthier work force. Since the Soviets had not signed the Geneva
Convention, the Nazis used this fact as an excuse for the ill-treatment of Soviet prisoners of
war.36 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) offered to work as an intermediary
in order to collect and transmit information about the wounded and prisoners.37 In response to
these offers, Vyacheslav Molotov, famous for the aforementioned Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,
marked all letters and telegrams received from the ICRC with “‘Do Not Respond.’”38 Stalin,
Molotov, and others within the government did not want soldiers who had been captured to
receive care packages or send letters to loved ones as the leadership did not want to encourage
surrender.39 Internally, the Soviets did not want the ICRC to come into Soviet camps as they
were concerned that the ICRC “might stumble on secrets of Stalin's prewar repressions.”40 This
was to be the case with Soviet prisoners across the warfront as those POWs, and those who
returned at the end were sent to special camps established by the NKVD. According to historian
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[Viktor] Zemskov, about 1.5 million former prisoners passed through the filtration camps. Out of
this number, “about 245,000 were repressed.”41
Following the end of the war, Father Ionov moved to the United States and published
memoirs in which he argued that he and others of the Mission never collaborated with the
Germans. Enstad points out that, while they may have not explicitly worked with the Germans,
the priests’ actions did assist the Nazi occupiers. As shown through Father Alexander in The
Priest, Father Ionov was stuck between a rock and a hard place of working with the Nazis or the
Soviets. By working alongside the Nazis to reopen the churches in northeastern Russia, it
appeared to the Soviets that the priests were collaborating with the Germans. It was difficult for
the priests to look at the reopening of churches as a bad thing even if it were the Nazis who were
doing it. While the Nazis could be thanked for reopening them, the priests were able to use these
churches as a launching point to provide the locals with schools and other necessary goods.
Along with this, the Mission and Father Ionov worked to improve the lives of Soviet POWs in
Nazi camps. Father Ionov, and his fictional portrayal, Father Alexander, depict the difficulties
faced by the Mission and its priests during the war of whether to work alongside the Nazis or to
refuse and potentially face deadly consequences. Later, after the Soviets retook the area, priests,
as shown by Father Alexander, faced deadly consequences for “collaborating” with the Nazis,
being taken off to the Gulag.
Notably, as Enstad points out, the Pskov Mission was silent about the Holocaust
atrocities committed against the Jews and the Roma, among many others. He notes that it is hard
to believe that the Mission was ignorant of the atrocities being committed by the Germans, but
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the Russian Orthodox Church was, as Enstad points out, stuck between aiding those being
persecuted, potentially causing the Germans to withdraw their support of the Church, and staying
silent, allowing the Orthodox Church to remain open and continue its mission. Furthermore,
Enstad argues that this lack of response to German atrocities attests to a degree of antisemitism
within the Orthodox Church. As argued by Sergii, the Orthodox Church had never come to
accept the Bolsheviks as the legitimate leaders of Russia, and the Nazis, whom Sergii served,
associated Bolshevism and the Russian Revolution with Jews.42 It is thus unsurprising that the
Orthodox Church disliked Bolshevism, and some priests associated Judaism with Bolshevism,
and thus disliked the Jews. Throughout the 1930s, Orthodox Christian groups within the Pskov
region were responsible for spreading antisemitic messages and Nazi propaganda.43 When the
Orthodox mission arrived to Pskov, then, the people within the area already held antisemitic
views and were unlikely to notice or care about whether the Orthodox Church responded to
German atrocities against the Jews.
Khotinenko, in his film depiction of the Pskov Mission, does not invoke the Holocaust
directly, as this would draw the focus of the story away from the Russian Orthodox Church and
its plight during the Great Patriotic War. He does have Father Alexander save a Jewish girl,
Hava, with the means available to him, but this fits into the larger narrative of Russian
Orthodoxy being the only viable religion within the film. It is not meant to invoke the Holocaust
but is meant to show how Russian Orthodoxy can save one both in this life and in the next. It is
one of the few times where Khotinenko’s form of antisemitism depicted in The Priest fits into
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the actual history of the region. Just as the Pskov Mission in reality does not address the
Holocaust, the Mission in the film does not address the Holocaust either.
In the beginning of the film, Hava’s father, Moisei, appears briefly with Hava’s sisters to
ask Father Alexander to convince Hava not to convert to Russian Orthodoxy, and Father
Alexander agrees, to an extent. The priest tells Hava that conversion is a step of great
responsibility, and she should think twice before making such a decision. Luckily for Hava, she
does convert and is christened Eva. Throughout much of the film, but especially with Eva’s
baptism, there is both a literal and a spiritual meaning. The literal meaning is that Eva is saved
from the Nazis, and the spiritual meaning is that she is saved from sin. Since Eva’s previous
family does not convert and does not reappear in the narrative, she is most likely the only person
from her nuclear family who did indeed survive.
Eva’s conversion to Christianity being what saves her ties into the larger and quite
problematic message of The Priest which suggests that there are certain ethnicities, religions, and
languages which are valued and others which are less important. For example, when the Nazis
first arrive and begin to occupy the Pskov region, the Latvians are shown welcoming the Nazis
with bread and salt, two traditional gifts in Russian culture. They are rebuked for this by other
Latvian-speaking villagers to whom the Latvians who greet the Nazis respond with anger. While
the film translates German, it chooses not to translate Latvian, leaving viewers to guess at the
meaning of the words from facial expressions and actions alone. In this scene, German is
important to translate so as to provide understanding to viewers. At the same time, Latvian is
presented as the language of the traitors, and the intricacies of the language do not need to be
understood by the viewers. They simply need to know that the Latvians are collaborating with
the Nazis, and that is enough.
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In his own way, Khotinenko reenacts in this film the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. He gives
enough narrative space to the Germans and the Russians and does not give any explanation as to
how the Latvians even ended up in the plot. German is the language of a worthy adversary, both
in the context of the film’s story and in the geopolitical rivalry the film portrays. Latvian, on the
other hand, is the language of a people who were conquered under Stalin and subjugated to
Soviet rule for nearly 50 years. Khotinenko never references the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and
there is no explanation as to why there are Latvians in this area. The director simply portrays
them as foreigners on historic Russian land. This is the land which Alexander Nevsky defended,
saving Russian culture from the West, and the Latvians are the interlopers. While, in reality, the
Russians are the interlopers on Latvian territory, Khotinenko and those sponsoring the film are
working to form a narrative surrounding World War II in which the Soviets/Russians did no
wrong. The Latvians, on the other hand, are solely shown as collaborators with the Nazis and
thus could do no right. Without any explanation about how Latvia became part of the USSR, the
Latvians are shown betraying the Russians (not Soviets), leading to the question of whether the
Latvians are partially to blame for Soviet (in the film, it is Russian) failure in the beginning of
the war. While the film leaves this question open-ended, it can be assumed that Khotinenko
would answer with a resounding, “Yes!” to that question.
Yiddish is entirely excluded from the film, even though it was the language spoken by
Jews within the region at the time.44 Eva’s father, at the beginning of the film, speaks Russian
with Father Alexander, and Eva’s family, for the short time they are on screen, is never heard
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speaking Yiddish. By having the Jews in the film disappear after the first ten minutes and never
speak Yiddish, Khotinenko makes both their religion and their language less important for the
authenticity of the film’s story. Khotinenko did not bother to get actors to speak Yiddish nor did
he later go through the effort of translating the language for Russian viewers. This is even
assuming that the director would have translated it and not have given it the same treatment as
Latvian. Clearly, though, Yiddish is beneath Latvian, a “dialect” in the film, since it is never
even spoken.
The only unquestionably worthy languages within the film are Russian and Old Church
Slavonic, as these are the languages of the Russian people and the Orthodox Church, which is,
literally, “the sacred language.” The Russian people within the film are portrayed as the only
redeemable characters, so long as they adhere to Orthodox Christianity. Furthermore, Russian
people are presented as the only Soviet people within the film. A very narrow and historically
inaccurate use of the word “Soviet,” it is meant to draw on the nationalism of Russian viewers
and to tie them back to the events of the Great Patriotic War, a founding myth promoted by the
modern-day Russian government.
Instead of focusing on the brutalities committed by the Soviet state against their citizens,
the Church and state focus on the victories achieved by the Soviet army and government. There
are few terrible Soviets in the film, except for one of the cruel partisan political commissars and
the soldiers led by the NKVD officer who arrest Father Alexander at the end of the film. It is
known, though, from Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s historical work The GULAG Archipelago and
from research conducted by Memorial International, state terror and the camp economy were the
foundations of the Soviet system. The Nazi POW camp is shown throughout the film, and as
discussed above, it is lacking food and medical care for the Soviet POWs. The Red Cross was
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prevented from entering the camps to assist the prisoners since Stalin refused to sign the Geneva
Convention, but Khotinenko brushes past this fact when depicting the camp. If he had chosen to
discuss it, it would have been necessary to also discuss the treatment of Soviets in the GULAG
camps which was part of the reason why Stalin did not sign the Geneva Convention.45 When
Father Alexander is arrested following the return of the Soviets to the region, he is taken away to
the GULAG, but Khotinenko chooses not to show these camps. Father Alexander is shown,
though, returning from the camps around 30 years later, emerging aged but unbowed. The
camps, as the integral part of Soviet life, are left untouched by Khotinenko, demonstrating that
Soviet culture and identity is auxiliary to the main narrative while Russian Orthodoxy is at the
center.
By excluding the GULAG from The Priest, Khotinenko is following the narrative set by
the modern day Russian government. Putin seeks to rehabilitate the memory of Stalin by
downplaying the mass deportations and imprisonments that occurred across the country. This can
be seen in the decisions taken to close down non-governmental organizations, in particular,
Memorial International, which documented the crimes committed in the camps under Stalin’s
regime. The reason given for closing down Memorial International is that the organization “is
mendaciously portraying the USSR as a terrorist state.”46 This is exactly what the USSR was,
though, as it used mass violence against its own citizens since there was no other arbiter, such as
the law or an independent court system, to do so. While it was not until 2021 that Putin made the
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move to close Memorial International, there were steps taken over the years that led to this
decision. The Priest was one of those as it simply hinted at where Father Alexander was being
taken and never directly referenced the GULAG.
Beyond language and ethnicity, there is only one “good” religion within the film, too,
which is Russian Orthodoxy. It has to be specifically Russian Orthodoxy as it must tie into the
only viable ethnicity, Russian. As shown through Eva, Judaism is not an option since her family
perishes (we assume since the film never even bothers to let the viewers know, and Eva never
looks for her non-Christian relatives), and it is Russian Orthodox Christianity that saves Eva.
Islam is not even mentioned within the film, though there is a large Muslim population within
the Russian Federation and definitely within the former Soviet Union. Both Communism and
Nazism are presented as pseudo-religions, but both are shown to fail when compared to Russian
Orthodox Christianity. For The Priest, the message of the film relies on three underlying facts:
Russian is the only genuinely spiritual ethnicity, despite Soviet propaganda; Russian Orthodox
Christianity always remained deep inside Russians (other faiths and ethnicities are bracketed for
the sake of an accessible film story); and Russian Orthodoxy is the only correct faith.
In the course of the film, Eva becomes a motherly figure in the orphaned children’s lives
after Alevtina, Father Alexander’s wife, passes away. Father Alexander and his wife, Alevtina,
as part of their ministry through the Mission, serve the prisoners of war (POWs) in the Nazi
camp nearby. As is the case for many of the Nazi camps, there is a dearth of food, clothing, and
other items needed if the POWs are to survive. Father Alexander and Alevtina make up for this
lack, but they are unable to solve the issue entirely. It should come as no surprise, then, that
typhus begins to spread throughout the camp. Alevtina, on one of the missions to provide food
and clothing, ends up catching typhus from the POWs. Knowing how infectious the disease is,
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Alevtina decides that, rather than infecting her adopted children, she will leave the home and die
elsewhere. This sacrifice for the children is meant to be reminiscent of the sacrifice of Jesus
Christ for sinners, and Alevtina ends up suffering a painful death in the winter snow just as Jesus
suffered a painful death on the cross. Instead of killing others as the Nazis and Soviets do,
Alevtina gives up her own life, a trope familiar in the Russian tradition not only from the
Gospels but also from the lives of saints, such as “The Martyrdom of Boris and Gleb” and more
recently from Fyodor Dostoevsky’s novels.
Conveniently from the narrative point of view, Alevtina’s death opens up the way for Eva
to become the motherly figure to the adopted children and to become the progenitor of the new
race following the end of the war. Eva and the other orphaned children serve as a narrative
device of the film to tug on viewer’s heartstrings and provide evidence against the secular
ideologies that failed them. The children who arrive at the Mission have either escaped the Siege
of Leningrad, where millions died of starvation, or escaped German occupied towns, where they
were having their blood drawn for military purposes. These horrors of the war are made that
much more impactful as they have occurred to children, who, according to the filmmaker, are
always sweet and innocent. The orphans are never shown acting up or misbehaving; instead, they
are always sitting quietly, learning about Christianity from Eva and doing household chores. Led
by Aleksei and Eva, these children are meant to go forward into the post-war world and create a
new spiritual community.
Continuing what Alevtina started, Eva teaches the orphans about her newly acquired
faith. Eva is not simply meant to be a mother and teacher, though. One of the partisan soldiers,
Aleksei, begins a romantic relationship with Eva, following the death of his fianceé by the Nazis.
Aleksei and Eva are meant to be a 20th century version of the Bible’s Adam and Eve, forming a
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new community following the destruction of much of humankind. Khotinenko makes this
explicit by naming the main female character Eva, meaning Eve, and making her a motherly
figure, like the biblical Eve, to the orphaned children. The pair are meant to be the leaders of this
spiritual family which will bring faith capable to challenge both Nazi and Soviet ideologies.
The start of this new community is reminiscent of both Adam and Eve and of Noah.
While there are meant to be clear parallels between the stories of Adam and Eve and Aleksei and
Eva, the story of Noah also fits in with the plot of the film. Noah, his family, and two of each
animal spend 40 days on an ark while God floods the earth to eradicate sinners. After the flood is
over, Noah and his family begin a new society based on biblical principles, similar to Aleksei
and Eva following the end of World War II. The biblical story of Noah and the Ark sees the
defeat of unchristian beliefs, just as The Priest shows the true way in place of the deeply flawed
ideologies.
What filmmakers know as a melodramatic device of a miraculous coincidence, or what
Christians call a miracle, is a common thread throughout the movie. Eva’s desire to convert to
Christianity right before the Nazis invade the Soviet Union is a miraculous coincidence as this
ends up saving her from the fate suffered by the Jews, including her original family. In fact,
conversion to Orthodox Christianity, the only ideology offered up in the film as a viable choice
for a person of integrity, is used as a miraculous coincidence multiple times. The children who
arrive from Leningrad and other cities around the Soviet Union all convert to Christainity, and
thus they are saved from the Nazis, too. In the beginning of the film, one of the soldiers leaving
for the front asks Alexander for a blessing but runs off before Father Alexander completes it. By
the fact that the soldier is never seen again, viewers can assume that he died on the front but
would have survived had he received this blessing. This missed opportunity, or miraculous
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coincidence, shows how Orthodox Christianity, in the movie’s interpretation, is the only
ideology that can save one’s life and, most importantly, soul.
Alevtina’s death is presented as a miraculous coincidence: the director of the film has to
remove Alevtina from the plot, through one way or another, to make Eva the new motherly
figure of the film. Death is an easy way to get rid of a character, and the director then has the
opportunity to interpret the death as they see fit, without the character’s input. In the context of
the film, Khotinenko interprets her death as a sacrifice for the children, like Christ’s sacrifice for
the sinners. In case post-Soviet viewers still missed the ideological point, Khotinenko presents
this interpretation through the letter Alevtina leaves for Father Alexander, asking him to forgive
her and to ensure the children remember her fondly, and finally via an inscription on her
gravestone, which says, “Servant of God.”
The biggest miraculous coincidence of the film, though, is the scene, in which a Soviet
partisan, Aleksei, attempts to assassinate Father Alexander. Aleksei has been watching Father
Alexander and comes to the conclusion that the priest is collaborating with the Nazis. After
seeing Father Alexander enter the church alone one evening, Aleksei follows behind with a gun,
planning to murder Father Alexander. Before he commits the crime, however, he and Father
Alexander have a discussion about death and what it means to die. Aleksei asks Father
Alexander whether the priest is afraid to die, to which Father Alexander responds in the
affirmative but says that, “If it is my time, so be it.” Aleksei does attempt to shoot Father
Alexander, but he misses, hitting the Mother of God icon instead. The icon, known as “Our
Lady of the Way” or Hodegetria, shields the priest. Mary, Mother of God, and the young Jesus
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are depicted in the icon, with the Mother of God gesturing to Jesus, as He is the Way.47 Jesus, in
turn, usually has his hand raised, blessing the viewer.

Figure 4. “History and Theological Idea of the Hodegetria Icon,” image, December 26, 2019,
https://russianicon.com/history-and-theological-idea-of-the-hodegetria-icon/. Hodegetria, or the
Mother of God icon.
The symbolism of the bullet hitting the Mother of God icon, a protector for the Russian
people, instead of Father Alexander is not lost on anyone. Father Alexander, similarly to the
Mother of God, is the one who knows the way. He guides multiple characters throughout the
film, including Eva and Aleksei, towards Orthodox Christianity, the only ideology considered to
be a viable option, according to the film. There are other ideologies, or “ways” presented in the
film, but Orthodox Christianity is the only viable “way”.
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After missing him, Father Alexander offers Aleksei the chance to confess his sins, and
Aleksei takes him up on this. By missing the priest and then confessing to his sins, Aleksei is
redeemed for his crime of trying to kill the priest, opening the door for him to serve as the
patriarch of the new community.
Following the miracle of the icon protecting the film’s courageous priest, the next most
important miraculous coincidence is Eva meeting the love of her life. To create the opportunity
for Aleksei and Eva to fall in love, Khotinenko sets up multiple melodramatic turns which
climax in the chance meeting between the pair.
Aleksei was originally in love with another girl in the village, Masha (an allusion to
Mary, a pivotal biblical name), who was mocked and violated by the Nazis. After Masha slaps a
Nazi for assaulting her, one of the Nazis shoots and kills her. While it originally looked like the
bullet missed her, which would have been a miraculous coincidence, it was quickly shown that
she was shot and killed. This is a miracle, though, as it makes Aleksei single and able to get
together with the person with whom he is destined to be -- Eva.
This miraculous coincidence of the Nazi soldier appearing to have missed Masha and
actually hitting her is meant to be one of the anti-miracles of the film. Unlike Russian Orthodox
Christianity, which can perform true miracles, Nazism is only able to perform anti-miracles due
to the faults in its value system. Miracles are meant to be joyful and good, for example when
Eva’s baptism ends up saving her life, but the anti-miracles are meant to expose the flaws of the
value they stand for. While the scene at first gives the viewer hope that Masha has survived the
encounter with the Nazis, this hope is quickly crushed when Masha is shown bleeding and falling
to her death. Khotinenko seeks to, through this crushed hope, show that there are no ideologies
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other than Russian Orthodox Christianity that can provide one with hope.48 Nazism fails, as seen
through Masha’s death. Lastly, Soviet ideology fails when Father Alexander hopes that he will
not be arrested following the Soviets’ return to Pskov. In the end, Christianity, and Father
Alexander’s belief in it, gives him the hope that he will someday return to Pskov, which he does
at the end of the film. Not quite historically accurate, the city is represented as being full of
churches with a flourishing monastery amidst the late socialist Soviet Union. Perhaps the reason
for this choice is the present day perception in Putin-era Russia that the Brezhnev-era was the
golden age of the Soviet/Russian Empire and was a time when the Russian Church was quite
prominent.
The film has these miraculous coincidences which fall in line with Christian beliefs,
providing the viewer with hope, and others which align with the other ideologies of the film,
causing the characters’ and, by association, the viewers’ expectations to be crushed. For
Khotinenko, Christianity provides every major character in the film with a miraculous
coincidence which fills them with hope for the future.
For Eva, her miraculous coincidence is her conversion to Christianity, performed by
Father Alexander right on the eve of the Nazi invasion. By converting to Christianity and
avoiding death at the hands of the Nazis, Eva eventually gets together with Aleksei. This
amazing narrative turn contradicts the point made by Hava’s father in the beginning of the film,
when Eva first wants to convert. Her father worries that, if Eva converts to Christianity, she will
not be able to marry as she will neither be accepted by the Christian community nor the Jewish
community. However, there was never any risk that Eva, the main female love interest of the
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film, was not going to be accepted by the Orthodox Christian community. The Russian Orthodox
Church, a sponsor of the film, would never have allowed Khotinenko to present the Church as
anything but accepting of all types of people. The irony, though, is that the film is only inclusive
about Russians and Orthodox Christians. No other ethnicities or ideologies are presented as
viable options, meaning that it was predestined for Eva to join and be accepted in the Orthodox
community. Hava’s conversion creates a new family for her where she is first accepted by Father
Alexander and Alevtina, then by Aleksei, and lastly by the other adopted children. Had she not
converted, Eva never would have had this chance to find acceptance and Christian love.
While Masha’s death and Hava’s conversion both occur before Aleksei and Eva ever
meet, their meeting is the pinnacle of the miraculous coincidences which bring the two together.
They end up running into each other on the way to Pskov, Aleksei to find Masha and Eva to find
Father Alexander. Aleksei takes Eva under his wing, protecting her on the way to Pskov, and this
is when the two begin to form their relationship. Upon arrival in Pskov, Eva is adopted by Father
Alexander and Alevtina while Aleksei joins the partisans to fight against the Nazi occupiers.
This keeps them both near Pskov and seeing each other on a regular basis, fostering their
romantic relationship, leading to the new community that will be born following the end of the
war. Father Alexander and his wife, Alevtina, end up being unable, either through imprisonment
or death, to care for the children and start this new community, leaving Eva and Aleksei in
charge. They are young, healthy, and are the clear choices to lead the formation of this new
postwar world. In ideological terms, it is to be a newly formed community that embraces
Christianity delivered via the Russian language and which rejects both inferior secular
alternatives: Nazi racism and Soviet atheistic dogma. No other secular alternatives are presented.
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Khotinenko makes reference to two films, Alexander Nevsky, and Leni Riefenstahl’s
Triumph des Willens (Triumph of the Will, 1935), within the larger story of The Priest. Both
Alexander Nevsky and Triumph of the Will are propaganda films, the former for the Soviets and
the latter for the Nazis. In the timeline of the film, the Soviets show Alexander Nevsky before the
Nazi invasion. After the Nazis occupy Pskov, they bring in their own set of films to show the
Soviet people. One of these films is Triumph of the Will, directed by Leni Riefenshtal.49 In the
screengrab below, the Nazis are shown bringing in a collection of propaganda films to show
occupied Pskov, with Triumph of the Will being clearly shown on the side.

Figure 5. “Poster of Triumph of the Will,” Vladimir Khotinenko, The Priest, 2009. From The
Priest, this is the Nazi truck bringing in Nazi newsreels and propaganda.
Khotinenko’s purpose in using both Alexander Nevsky and Triumph of the Will is to
present two other ideologies and to show how these fall short when compared to Orthodox
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Christianity. When Alexander Nevsky is shown in the Soviet community center located in the
former church, Aleksei and Masha are present and absent at the same time. Instead of watching a
propaganda film, they end up talking to each other. The director sets up a hierarchy of values for
the characters and the viewers. Aleksei and Masha value a relatively private moment with each
other much more than the film. In the Soviet society in which they live, there are few truly
private spaces, so the pair must work to create their own. The irony of when Aleksei and Masha
choose to have a private moment together is that the message of Alexander Nevsky is about the
importance of the communal efforts and the drawbacks of the individual who chooses to act on
his own. The private moment which the two have during the film is one shared between two
individuals, contradicting the message about the benefits of the collective group. For Aleksei and
Masha, the constant presence of people, watching and analyzing one another’s every move, is a
negative as it prevents the two from connecting on a deeper level. The screening of Alexander
Nevsky in the Soviet community center is the first time the two truly get the chance to talk in a
more confidential setting even though there are people all around them. Those around them,
instead of observing the actions of others in the crowd, are focused on the film. One of the
messages of Alexander Nevsky, though, is to observe those around oneself as some in the crowd
may be traitors, as is the case of the priest and the merchant within the film. To have the Soviets
in The Priest be distracted by Alexander Nevsky, a film telling them to be observant, to provide
Aleksei and Masha with a bit of privacy is a clever move on the part of Khotinenko. It belies the
message of Alexander Nevsky, furthering Khotinenko’s case as to why Soviet ideology is not a
viable ideology within the setting of The Priest and, in turn, real life. Khotinenko, through this
scene, is arguing for the individual over the collective as he focuses on Aleksei and Masha
getting the chance to finally speak privately over the message of the film.
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The director makes sure he reminds the viewers of the setting of the film showing. While
talking through the movie, Aleksei brings up the fact that the community center used to be a
church dedicated to Alexander Nevsky. Ultimately, the meaning of the entire scene is about the
filmmaker and the sponsoring institution, The Orhrodox Encyclopedia, making a point about the
value they place on this piece of Soviet propaganda.
Eisenstein’s film is not the only propaganda film invoked in Khotinenko’s film. The
Nazis bring their own cinema to the locals: Leni Riefenstahl’s The Triumph of the Will (original
title first time mentioned Triumph des Willens). In the film’s diegesis, the Nazis, however, do
not manage to Triumph of the Will to the conquered Soviets, but Khotinenko has a clear shot of
the poster for the notorious documentary film on the side of a Nazi truck bringing the newsreels
about the current German military successes. Unlike Alexander Nevsky, the Nazi propaganda
film is projected on the side of the church instead of inside of it, which sets up a certain
important for the present-day Russia hierarchy of totalitarian regimes: Soviets are obviously
better Nazis. Similarly to Aleksei and Masha, Father Alexander and a Soviet serving as a Nazi
officer, Ivan, are forced to watch the propaganda reels but talk throughout the screening. Father
Alexander questions why the Nazis want to show this film to the Soviets as the newsreel
critiques communism and celebrates the Red Army’s losses. The two then get into a discussion
about the treatment of POWs with the Nazi officer blaming Stalin for not signing the Geneva
Convention as the reason for why the POWs are suffering.50 During both movies, neither Aleksei
and Masha nor Father Alexander and Ivan are able to focus on the film and the propaganda it
portrays. Khotinenko, by having the pairs talk over the film, silences the propaganda being

50

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “The Treatment of Soviet POWs.”

35

spoken with a Christian message. In the case of Aleksei and Masha, the Christian message is
Aleksei mentioning that the space used to be a church dedicated to Alexander Nevsky. For
Father Alexander and Ivan, the two discuss the humane treatment of POWs, a Christian mission
which Father Alexander quickly begins. Viewers are not able to hear much of the propaganda
being shared within the films shown in The Priest but are instead inundated with the propaganda
of The Priest itself.
While Alexander Nevsky, which depicts the life of a saint, is allowed to be shown inside
the church, the Nazi propaganda is relegated outside to the church walls. Triumph of the Will,
and other Nazi propaganda films like it, include pagan imagery, such as the use of fire, the
portrayal of Hitler as a 20th century epic warrior, and the large gatherings of people idolizing the
Führer and the new eternal empire. By screening the film outside of the church, Khotinenko is
making the point that paganism would not enter the building and defile that sacred space.
Alexander Nevsky, unlike Triumph of the Will, is allowed to be shown inside the church as
Nevsky, in the final analysis, is an Orthodox saint and the underlying presence throughout the
film.

Chapter Three
The Priest is a memory vehicle of the early Putin era invoking Alexander Nevsky as the
spiritual diplomat who can handle the most difficult mission negotiating with the demonic
adversaries: Nazis and Soviets. After Russia unleashed the war against Ukraine in 2014, the
commemoration of Nevsky took a more militant turn. Beyond films, such as The Priest, using
the memory of Alexander Nevsky, the Russian government, official historians, and the Russian
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Orthodox Church have been using commemoration of the warrior-saint as the bedrock of their
campaign against the West.
While The Priest refers to Nevsky as primarily a peaceful Orthodox Christian saint,
recently Putin and the Kremlin have transformed the media image of Nevsky into a warrior-saint.
Stalin used this aspect of Nevsky’s persona in Eisenstein’s film, and Putin, who has begun
rehabilitating Stalin as an efficient statesman and military strategist, has taken this warrior
narrative and recycled it for his modern-day regime. For example, Putin has declared the year
2021 the “Year of Alexander Nevsky” as it coincides with the 800th anniversary of Nevsky’s
birth and has begun putting up monuments depicting Nevsky as a military leader and statesman.
His close associates, such as Patriarch Kirill, Metropolitan Tikhon, and former Minister of
Culture and current aide to the President, Vladimir Medinsky, organized numerous public events
promoting the cult of the strong leader, read the current leader.
In the fall of 2021, along the shores of Lake Chudskoe (known in the West as Lake
Peipus, the Estonian toponym for the lake), the Russian Ministry of Defense installed a
monument to honor Nevsky’s victory in the “Battle on Ice”-- the centerpiece of Eisenstein’s
film. Presumably, the “Battle on Ice” happened on this lake, and now the lake is the border of
Russia and Estonia. The monument, depicting Nevsky and his fellow soldiers, can be viewed
from neighboring Estonia , a member of both NATO and the European Union, as the monument
has been placed close to the border between the two countries. This is purposeful as Putin, using
the memory of Nevsky, is trying to send the message that Russia was able to defeat the Western
powers twice, during the “Battle on Ice” and later during World War II, and is capable of
opposing the West now. While Nevsky was originally used to rally the Soviet people against the
Germans, with both Eisenstein’s film and the military medal, during the early years of the Cold
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War, Stalin reframed the narrative of Nevsky as the defender of Russia against the West, Putin
has run with this idea, incorporating it into his larger narrative of a new ideological war between
the West and Russia.
To mobilize the nation, both the Russian, and, previously, the Soviet, propaganda
machine combined monumental sculptures with state media coverage of the production and
unveiling of these new monuments. Both now and then, monuments are constructed to be part of
a larger argument that the state is trying to make. For the current Russian Federation, monuments
of Alexander Nevsky have begun popping up as part of this new propaganda war campaign
against the West. Following the end of World War II, the Soviet Union installed statues to
emphasize the victory of the USSR in World War II against the Nazis. This meaning was quickly
amended to include the West as the Cold War kicked off.
As Scott Palmer argues in his article “Construction of the Memorial to the Heroes of the
Battle of Stalingrad,” monumental sculptures had been the core of Soviet commemoration of
World War II and of the Soviet narrative of the Great Patriotic War. Palmer focused on the statue
meant to commemorate the Battle of Stalingrad, The Motherland Calls, and examined how
“descriptions of the site and the highlights of its construction were frequently published in Soviet
newspapers, journals, reference works, and guidebooks.”51 The state focused on “the colossal
size of the memorial complex as well as the copious amounts of concrete, metal, and labor that it
demanded.”52 Most importantly for the Kremlin, though, was that the monument was “the
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world’s tallest freestanding statue at the time of its completion.”53 Palmer also analyzes how the
meaning of the monument changed. It was originally meant to honor the Red Army soldiers who
fought in the Battle of Stalingrad but was changed by the state to honor all who had fought in the
Great Patriotic War.54 By expanding the purpose of the monument to include all Soviet people,
the Soviet state was able to include itself in the narrative and take the focus away from any
particular individual or group of individuals. This is the meaning that the current Putin’s official
historians and authors of monumental sculptures exploit.

Figure 6. Alexander M. Chabe, The Motherland Calls, photograph, Britannica,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Motherland-Calls.
Similarly, the Soviet War Memorial in Berlin is a military cemetery to honor those who
died during World War II, especially those in the Battle of Berlin, but the focal point of the
memorial is the statue depicting a gigantic Soviet soldier holding a rescued child in one arm and
standing atop a crushed swastika. The meaning of the monument comes from the fact that it was
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“the culmination of a Soviet effort to inscribe its story of victory on conquered territory.”55 In the
case of the sarcophagi that line the walkway leading up to the monument, the Soviet victory is
literally inscribed, with quotes from Joseph Stalin in both Russian and German engraved onto
them. The quotes reveal the name of the true victor over the Nazis. While the cemetery provides
a space for individuals to honor those who lost their lives in World War II, the main purpose of
the Soviet War Memorial is to celebrate the great leader’s and Soviet state’s victory over the
Nazis. Once again, there is no room for any individual to be remembered; instead, the might of
the Soviet state is what is meant to be commemorated.

Figure 7. Bernd Bricken, “Celebration on the 65. anniversary of the (russian) victory day in
Berlin, Germany, at the Soviet War Memorial in Treptow,” photograph, Wikipedia, May 9,
2010,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_War_Memorial_(Treptower_Park)#/media/File:9mai_trepto
w_015.jpg. The Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park, Berlin, Germany.
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In the 1990s this form of state-sponsored commemoration receded for it only to come
back in the new tidal wave of Putin’s reign. Similar to the aforementioned monuments of the
Soviet era, Prince Alexander Nevsky and His Retinue towers over its visitors, and the hill only
adds to this scale. By making each of the individuals depicted in these monuments so much
greater than the average person, the individuals shown become superhuman and unrelatable in
any way to those who have come to view the statue. Those honored within these monuments are
not meant to be accessible to the viewer but are meant to intimidate and awe.

Figure 8. “Vladimir Putin opened the memorial ‘Prince Alexander Nevsky and His Retinue,’”
photograph, Gatchinskaya Pravda, September 26, 2021, https://gtnpravda.ru/2021/09/16/vladimir-putin-otkril-memorial-knjaz-aleksandr-nevskiy-s-druzhinoy.html.
Prince Alexander Nevsky and His Retinue in the Pskov Region, Russia.
Putin traveled to the monument on September 11, 2021 and gave a message which
highlighted the stark divide that continues to exist between Russia and the West, supposedly for
at least the past 800 years. While on the surface, the decision to speak on this particular day
appears to be due to a holiday in the Orthodox Church, the underlying reason is because
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September 11, 2021 was the 20th anniversary of the terrorist attacks in the United States.56 In
2001, when the attacks occurred, Putin was the first to call American President George W. Bush
and give both his condolences and his support in fighting back against Al-Qaeda. On the same
day in 2021, Putin’s response could not have been more different. Instead of extending a hand to
the West to work together, Putin spoke of the defeat Nevsky and his men inflicted on the West in
the “Battle on Ice”.

Figure 9. “Speech at the ceremony unveiling the memorial complex Prince Alexander Nevsky
and his Retinue,” photograph, President of Russia, September 11, 2021,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66661.
Alongside Putin, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and Metropolitan Tikhon, Putin’s personal
priest, were present at the unveiling, both to speak and to bless the monument. According to
Вести (Vesti), Metropolitan Tikhon was the driving force behind the idea to erect a monument to
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Alexander Nevsky and his soldiers in this location.57 Positioned on the shores of Lake Chudskoe,
the border between Estonia and Russia, the monument is meant to depict Nevsky and his soldiers
returning victorious from a war against Western invaders.
Beyond Putin, Patriarch Kirill, and Metropolitan Tikhon, the governor of Pskov and
Vladimir Medinsky, former Minister of Culture, were present at the event. As Medinsky is the
former Minister of Culture, one may wonder why he was present at the event, but it is necessary
to look at his career to understand. Medinsky, now an aide to the President and chairman of the
Russian Military Historical Society, has been described by colleagues as a historian with a
questionable reputation.58 Medinsky has been accused “by his peers of everything from dubious
scholarship, to plagiarism, to outright propaganda.”59
Dubious scholarship refers to the scandal surrounding Medinsky’s dissertation which
“seeks to show how foreigners propagate tendentious, biased views about Russia.”60 An expert
council of the Higher Attestation Committee “recommended revoking Medinsky’s 2011
doctorate, taking umbrage with his thesis that looked at ‘problems of objectivity’ in the coverage
of Russian history from the second half of the 15th century to the 17th century.”61 When
reviewing Medinsky’s dissertation, experts on the council accused Medinsky of “‘ignoring
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sources if they contradict his theses’ and of not working dispassionately.”62 Furthermore, these
experts said that “the dissertation did not use original sources, but rather Russian translations,
which is not appropriate for a doctoral thesis and had even led to ‘curious errors.’”63 Even with
all of these allegations, Medinsky was able to keep his PhD with overwhelming approval by the
Higher Attestation Committee64. This should come as no surprise since this committee is under
the purview of the federal government, specifically the Ministry of Education and Science.65
If this were not enough, his writings allege that the “U.S.S.R never occupied the Baltic
states, it just ‘incorporated’ them…an infamous picture of a Nazi-Soviet military parade in
Poland in 1939 was ‘photoshopped’...[and that] anti-Semitism in Tsarist Russia has been ‘greatly
exaggerated."66 For Medinsky, “[t]he criterion for truthfulness and reliability of a historical
source lies in its correspondence with the national interests of Russia” which fits well with the
narrative the Kremlin promotes at home and abroad.67 The Kremlin and its allies support
Medinsky, describing him as “‘an energetic man, a good manager and ideologue.’”68 It should
come as no surprise, then, that Medinsky has been awarded the Order of Alexander Nevsky and
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was involved, as chairman of the Russian Military Historical Society, in the building of the
monument.
The Order of Alexander Nevsky goes not only to military historians with strong ties to
Putin’s government but also to media personalities who provide propaganda coverage to military
expeditions, including, above all, Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014.69 While
not present at the event, Vladimir Solovyov, a notorious TV host and media personality, is a part
of this reframing of Russian history, having received an Order of Alexander Nevsky for his “high
professionalism and objectivity in covering events in the Republic of Crimea.”70 He currently is
at the helm of the information war against Ukraine, presenting the Russian army invading
Ukraine as a liberation of Ukrainians from the “Nazi” government.
Though he was not physically there at the unveiling of the monument to Alexander
Nevsky and his retinue, Solovyov covered the event on his radio show, Solovyov Live. Streamed
on September 11, Solovyov’s coverage of the monument occurs within the first ten minutes of
what is over three hours of news coverage. Prior to his discussion of the monument, Soloyvov
discusses Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the Soviet secret police, and remarks on how it pains
him that young people in Russia do not know who Dzerzhinsky is. He then begins to cover the
monument of Nevsky, clicking through photos and remarking on who was present at the opening
and on how magnificent the monument is. Solovyov finishes off the segment by remarking that,

69

Wikipedia contributors, "Russo-Ukrainian War," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, accessed April 14, 2022,
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Russo-Ukrainian_War&oldid=1082595300. Wikipedia has titled the
invasion/annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-fledged invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 as the RussoUkrainian War. While having split these into two separate events, since the Crimean annexation is considered
complete but the invasion ongoing, they both fall under this title. Interestingly enough, when looking to translate this
entry into Russian to determine what the Russian title for this is, there used to be no Russian-language entry. There
is now an entry under the same title as the English entry, but the current war is described as a “severe crisis”.
70
Wikipedia contributors, "Vladimir Solovyov (journalist)," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, accessed April 14,
2022, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Vladimir_Solovyov_(journalist)&oldid=1082511777.

45

now that there is a monument to Nevsky, there can be a monument to Dzerzhinsky in front of the
FSB building. This is in reference to the debate a few months prior over what monument should
be installed in Lubyanka Square where the headquarters of the FSB is located: to reinstall the
Soviet-era Dzerzhinsky monument currently resting in the Muzeon Park of totalitarian sculpture.
A vote was held to determine which individual should be honored, and it came down to Nevsky
or Dzerzhinsky. In the end, neither was installed, but Soloyvov, by referencing this debate,
suggests that a Dzerzhinsky monument must be re-installed if a Nevsky monument has found an
appropriate place at the border with the West.
By referencing first Nevsky and then Dzerzhinsky, Soloyvov clearly views the two in a
similar way as defenders of Russia against enemies of the state, both externally and internally.
After stating that he desires the replacement of the Dzerzhinsky monument, Solovyov remarks
on how he wishes there were still more state repression as this would solve all of the problems of
the modern-day Russian state, particularly the problem of Alexei Navalny. While Dzerzhinsky’s
methods of state-led political terror would solve the problems inside modern-day Russia,
Nevsky’s supposed war on the West (as depicted in Eisenstein’s film) would solve the
geopolitical problems facing Russia externally.
Solovyov is not the only noticeable absence at the unveiling of the Nevsky monument;
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu is also strangely missing from the event. While it seems odd that
Solovyov, a leading propagandist, is not present, it is even stranger that Shoigu, head of the
Ministry who sponsored the creation of this monument, is not there. When looking at the list of
those who attended the event, though, it is thus revealed why neither Solovyev, of Jewish
heritage, and Shoigu, of Mongolian heritage, are missing. This event is for Russians and
Russians only. This commemoration is meant to be a celebration of Russian heritage, and, while

46

the statue appears to be inviting the West into this celebration, it apparently is not inviting those,
like Solovyev and Shoigu, who do not fit into this Russocentric Orthodox narrative.
Along with the exclusion of different ethnicities and faiths, women are also excluded
from the monument except for a single image of the Mother of God. This image, however, does
not invite women to connect with the monument as the Mother of God is not meant to be
someone to whom women can compare themselves. She is depicted on one of the banners carried
by Nevsky’s retinue, separating her even further from women who may, however unlikely, visit
the monument. Men are depicted on all aspects of the monument, including the mural. The faces
of the Retinue, modeled after the 6th paratrooper company soldiers, invite men to compare
themselves to these modern soldiers who are meant to represent the bravery and religiosity of the
Russian state.71
Russian sculptor Vitaly Shanov constructed the monument. He has worked closely with
both church and state in the past, having designed the doors for the Cathedral of the New Martyrs
and Confessors of Russia on the Blood as part of the Sretensky Monastery in Moscow.72 As in
the times of the Soviet Union where certain sculptors had a monopoly on creating statesponsored works, Shanov has been “chosen” to create many of the current monuments sponsored
by both the Russian government and the Russian Orthodox Church.
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According to the government news coverage and from the website for the President of
Russia, volunteers from the Russian Student Brigade and the Volunteers of Culture movement
were involved “in beautification projects in villages adjacent to the historical and cultural
complex” as part of the larger construction of the monument.73 The brigades hearken back to the
construction brigades under the Komsomol of the Soviet Union since the current teams were also
established by the leading party, United Russia, and do the same exact work.74 These student
volunteers are part of a larger effort by the government to bring the state and its people together
in an intergenerational partnership. As part of this, Putin spoke with the student volunteers
following his speech and had the chance to share in a special moment with them. As a student
shared with Putin about the work that went into the beautification projects, Putin spotted a sedge
of cranes flying past the monument and stopped the student to point this out to the crowd. In the
news coverage by VGTRK Pskov, someone can be heard remarking that this is a good omen for
the monument.75 The entire exchange between the student and Putin appears staged as it looks to
simply be an opportunity for the media to showcase this partnership between state and citizen,
and the moment with the cranes only adds to this effect.76
The Russian Military Historical Society, with support from the Ministry of Defense,
sponsored “Alexander Nevsky and His Retinue,” and they worked closely with the Russian
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Orthodox Church to combine military and religious imagery in the monument. On the back of
the monument, there is an Altar to Military Glory where individuals can light a candle before the
icon of Alexander Nevsky. This altar, which faces Estonia, depicts Nevsky and his men winning
the Battle on Ice as the icon of Christ Not Made by Hands floats above them, seeming to say that
Christ has blessed this victory. While the altar depicts the battle itself, the monument represents
Nevsky and his men returning home victorious from this battle. Since it faces Estonia the altar
looks to be inviting the Estonians, and the West as a whole, into the Russian community which
still follows Christian values.

Figure 10. “Mosaic Triptych of St. Alexander Nevsky and His Retinue,” Mир 24, “Памятник
Александру Невскому открыли на Чудском озере [Monument to Alexander Nevsky opened
on Lake Peipsi],” September 12, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w_I_iS4ZE44. The
mosaic on the backside of Prince Alexander Nevsky and His Retinue in the Pskov Region,
Russia.
The mosaic triptych on “Alexander Nevsky and His Retinue” is meant to be reminiscent
of the triptych created by Pavel Korin in 1942 which had Alexander Nevsky at the center. Made
as part of the larger war effort for the Great Patriotic War, Korin’s triptych is unique for the art
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of the time as it contains clear religious references. Both the one above and the one below
contain the symbol of “Christ with the Fiery Eye,” either floating in the sky or depicted on a
banner, respectively, along with a Novgorodian church behind them.77 In the painting shown
below, there is meant to be an “air of solemn heroism” which, one assumes, is also meant to be
invoked in the triptych above.78 However, it is the muted colors of Korin’s triptych that give off
solemnity and are what is lacking in the triptych above. While the new triptych above contains
solely images of battle, Korin’s “Alexander Nevsky” was the centerpiece between “Northern
Ballad” and “Ancient Legend”, making all three images “symbolical representations of Russia's
past.”79 In the case of both triptychs, they were created to encourage those entering battle, either
against the Nazis or now Ukraine, respectively.
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Figure 12. “Description of the painting ‘Alexander Nevsky,’” image, Art Drawing, January 23,
2016, http://www.art-drawing.ru/biographies/brief-biographies/733-korin-pavel. Section of the
“Alexander Nevsky” triptych by Pavel Korin.

Figure 13. “Description of the painting ‘Alexander Nevsky,’” image, Art Drawing, January 23,
2016, http://www.art-drawing.ru/biographies/brief-biographies/733-korin-pavel. Section of the
“Alexander Nevsky” triptych by Pavel Korin. “Alexander Nevsky” triptych by Pavel Korin. On
the far left, “Northern Ballad”; in the center, “Alexander Nevsky”; on the far right, “Ancient
Legend”.
Placed on top of a hill, the monument, if it were close to any towns, would be able to be
seen from a distance. However, the government decided to place the monument close to where
the Battle on Ice occurred, meaning that it is far from any nearby city and, thus, difficult to
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access. In fact, it might be easier for Estonians sailing on the lake to see the monument than for
any Russian to see it. Perhaps this is one expected audience for the monument. On the day that
the monument was dedicated, Putin and the other church and state officials came by helicopter,
showing how challenging this monument would be to reach by any other mode of transportation.
There are no visible paved roads or towns in the news coverage of the monument, implying that
the monument is not meant to be viewed in person and accessible to the lay observer via
government channel’s TV screen.
By inadvertently limiting the ability of the majority of Russians to actually visit the
monument, both the government and the Russian Orthodox Church are able to put their own spin
on the meaning of it and allow only this meaning to be shared via mass media. For Putin and
church leaders, the emphases of the monument are on the young age of the charismatic leader
and his retinue and on the continuity of traditional Christian values in present day Russia.
The current day Russian government is becoming more and more of a gerontocracy as
Putin and other leaders continue to remain in power. The leaders seem to be plagued by their
growing age, working to demonstrate how youthful and robust they still are. Putin, for example,
has videos, often from the early 2000s, released of him practicing judo, shooting guns, and
performing other athletic activities to demonstrate that he is still a youthful leader.
For Putin, strength and youthfulness are tied to the larger idea of masculinity. Many of
the photos that are released are from trips taken by Putin to the borders of Russia. There, he
portrays a certain kind of “‘frontier masculinity’ in which ‘remote spaces…are often framed as
‘testing places’ that invite men (often white and hailing from elsewhere) to exercise their
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endurance, innovation and strength.”80 While on these trips, Putin is shown fishing, horseback
riding, white-water rafting, and camping out in the wilderness.81
While the majority of photos are only of Putin, some do include other individuals such as
the current Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, or everyday Russian citizens. When the
individual is recognizable, as Defense Minister Shoigu is, Putin is depicted as the one in charge
as is the case in a photo from 2007 in which Putin “pours Shoigu a cup of tea while directing
Shoigu to a variety of snacks on the dining table”.82 Putin is shown as “one type of person (a
strong leader, giving orders, and always in charge) and [Shoigu] another (somebody who follows
orders and is willing to be pushed around).”83 When ordinary citizens are included in the photos,
Putin is presented as able to “find a ‘common language’ with all of Russia’s citizens” no matter
where in Russia he is.84

Figures 14 and 15. Dmitry Astakhov, “Putin serves tea to Russian emergency situations minister
Sergei Shoigu at the fortress Por-Bazhyn on Tere-Khol lake,” photograph, The Guardian, August
14, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/news/gallery/2007/aug/14/russia.internationalnews.
“Vladimir Putin visited a shepherd during a short vacation in Tuva,” photograph, Tuva Online,
August 4, 2009, https://www.tuvaonline.ru/2009/08/04/0843_putin-vtuve.html. On the left,
President Putin is alongside the Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu. On the right, President Putin
is meeting with an ordinary Russian citizen.
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In the instances where Putin is alone in the photo, the photographer has clearly staged the
image in such a way that Putin looks much larger than he actually is. For example, the photo
below shows Putin walking alongside the Khemchik River during his vacation in 2007.
According to Foxall, there are three dimensions to this photo: “the mountains and trees, … the
river, and, of course, … Putin.”85 By positioning Putin in the center of the photo, “the viewer…is
thus invited to think of Putin as an integral part of the Russian (political) landscape, both current
and in the future.”86
Similarly, Putin is positioned in the center of the photo of the new monument to Nevsky.
The details of the monument fade into the background, making Putin the most important aspect
of the photo. The perspective also makes Putin look much taller than he is, appearing to be of the
same height as the hill on which the statue is placed. The only part of the photograph that is
above the demiurgic leader is the monument to the warrior-saint. Beyond Putin and Nevsky, the
only other identifiable parts of the photo are the Orthodox-style cross topping a banner that
depicts the icon, Savior Not Made by Hands. By making these aspects of the photo stand out, the
Kremlin press service has ultimately engaged in hagiographic photography.
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Figures 16 and 17. Dmitry Astakhov, “Putin walking near the Khemchik river,” photograph, The
Guardian, August 14, 2007,
https://www.theguardian.com/news/gallery/2007/aug/14/russia.internationalnews. “Speech at the
ceremony unveiling the memorial complex Prince Alexander Nevsky and his Retinue,”
photograph, President of Russia, September 11, 2021,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66661.
On the left, President Putin is walking alongside the Khemchik River in eastern Russia. On the
right, President Putin is speaking in front of Prince Alexander Nevsky and His Retinue.
If a younger statesman meets with Putin, the state-run news uses his airbrushed photo, as
can be seen in the image below depicting Putin and Emmanuel Macron, President of France.
There is a twenty-five year age gap between the two leaders, but it is impossible to know this if
one was only looking at this photo released by one of the state-owned TV channels in Russia.
Along with age, state-run media often seeks to downplay the height difference between Putin and
other world leaders. There are many fewer photos of Putin standing next to another world leader
than there are photos of the two sitting down next to one another. In the rare case both are
standing, Putin is not close enough to the other individual to be able to measure his height off of
the other. For example, in the photograph shown below on the right, Putin is meeting with the
leader of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, who is 6’2. There are seven photos provided by the Kremlin
of this meeting, but none of them show the two leaders standing next to one another.
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Figures 18 and 19. “News Coverage of Telephone Call Between Putin and Macron,” Мир 24,
“Путин и Макрон поговорили по телефону [Putin and Macron spoke on the phone],” March 3,
2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M8WBy5d6sAg. “Talks with President of Azerbaijan
Ilham Aliyev,” photograph, President of Russia, February 22, 2022,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67830. On the left, an image from the news coverage
of a phone call between Presidents Putin and Emmanuel Macron of France. On the right, an
image from the meeting between Presidents Putin and Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan.
By focusing on age, though, Putin and the rest of his retinue only seem to elevate the
interest in this issue. During his speech to dedicate the monument, Putin highlighted how young
Nevsky and Nevsky’s brother were when fighting the Battle on Ice, leading the watcher to
compare how young Nevsky was with how old Putin is. This was most likely not the goal of
Putin’s speech, but, by drawing attention to it, it is all on which the watcher can focus.
For the Orthodox Church, especially, the monument underscores the message of Russia
maintaining its traditional Christian values in a world where, according to Russian media, the
West forgot its “true” values.87 According to church and state leaders, Nevsky fought the Battle
on Ice to prevent the Germans from imposing their Catholic ways onto the Russian Orthodox
people. For today’s Russian leaders, Catholicism has been replaced by Western liberalism, which
preaches atheism, LGBTQ+ rights, and feminism. By having the Altar of Military Glory face
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Estonia, the Nevsky monument is inviting the West as whole to return to the more traditional
values which are being preached by the Russian Orthodox Church and protected by the Russian
state.
Luckily, the “Monument to Alexander Nevsky and His Retinue” is not the only
monument that has been put up during 2021 to commemorate the 800th anniversary of Nevsky’s
birth. There are two other monuments that are worth noting as well: the monument at the
Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and the monument on the Russian
Khmeimim airbase in Syria. The former was unveiled only ten days before the monument on
Lake Chudskoe while the latter was unveiled on the anniversary of the Day of Lifting the Siege
of Leningrad on January 27.88 Both tie into the larger theme of Nevsky as both a war hero and
diplomat, but both commemorative services emphasized, in particular, Nevsky’s skills as a
diplomat. Each statue was placed near an Orthodox Church so as not to forget that Nevsky is
both a warrior-diplomat and saint.
At the opening ceremony of the Nevsky statue at MGIMO, Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov was present to dedicate the monument. The topic of Lavrov’s speech, Nevsky’s great acts
of diplomacy, should come as no surprise as MGIMO is the premier Russian university for
training up future diplomats. His speech, similar to that of Putin’s alongside Lake Chudskoe,
emphasized Nevsky’s defeats of the West and the current “attempts, mainly from the West, to
annoy, unnerve or unbalance” Russia.89 What differentiated it from Putin’s speech, though, is
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Lavrov talked about Russia’s friendship with the East. Putin, in his speech, made reference to the
words engraved by Mikhail Lomonosov on Nevsky’s tomb which state “… to the one who tamed
barbarism in the East and brought down envy in the West.”90 Lavrov, on the other hand,
described how today’s Russia is different from that of Nevsky’s in that Russia has protection
from allies in the East.91 Both speeches do contain the same central message that Russia, both in
the time of Nevsky and now, is facing troublesome neighbors in the West who seek to bring
about the downfall of Russia.
In Syria, the monument to Alexander Nevsky was placed on the Khmeimim airbase as
Nevsky is the patron saint of the military. In a speech given by the Deputy Commander of the
Group of Forces of the Russian Armed Forces in Syria, Rear Admiral Igor Kurochkin, the
emphasis of the monument is again placed on Nevsky’s success in fighting back against the West
in their attempts to overtake Russia. In particular, the Rear Admiral focused on how Nevsky was
able to evade “‘the provocations of the papal throne’” and not join the Catholics “‘in the Western
coalition against the Golden Horde.’”92 For the Rear Admiral, Nevsky is important as he was
“one of the founders and defenders of Russian statehood, who proved himself both on the
battlefields and in diplomacy.”93 The monument is not meant to merely be a commemoration of
the 800th anniversary of Alexander Nevsky’s birth but is also meant to demonstrate to Syria, the
Middle East, and the rest of the world that Russia is invested in Syria for the long haul.94 It is a
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more permanent marker of an agreement made between Russia and Syria which stated that
Russia will be militarily involved in Syria for, at least, the next forty-nine years.95 By placing a
monument to Alexander Nevsky on the base, Russia is making a statement to Syria that they plan
to honor this commitment and to the West, telling them that Russia has influence in the region
and will not be ignored.

Conclusion
After coming to power, Putin and his government began a process of archaization by
choosing individuals from the medieval ages, in particular, Alexander Nevsky, when looking for
figures off of which to base the legitimacy of the state. Many of the more recent leaders, such as
Stalin, were tainted with a legacy of repression which, more recently, has been erased, but, in the
beginning of Putin’s reign, did not appear to be a viable option. Since Nevsky and other leaders
of early Russia were solely remembered through films, books, and other sources of media, Putin
was able to shape the idea of Nevsky in whichever way he wanted. In the early part of his reign,
Nevsky was presented as a diplomat through films like The Priest since this was what Putin
himself wanted to be seen as. In 2014, though, Putin invaded Ukraine for the first time and thus
changed both his and Nevsky’s image from that of a diplomat to that of a warrior and, in the case
of Nevsky, a saint. This image has persisted since 2014 and reached its peak in 2021 and 2022.
Following the invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, this transformation of Alexander
Nevsky from diplomat to warrior-saint looks to be complete. The films of the early Putin-era,
namely The Priest, which promoted a peaceful form of Russian Orthodoxy and of diplomacy
have been replaced by monuments across Russia and even worldwide that espouse the ideals of a
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more nationalist form of Russian Orthodoxy and of violence. It is ironic to consider that these
would now be paired together when one considers the usual message of Christianity, but that is
exactly what has happened as Patriarch Kirill prays for the victims of the war while publicly
supporting the Russian Army at the same time. Those who have received the Order of St.
Alexander Nevsky, namely Vladimir Solovyov, Vladimir Medinsky, and the Patriarch, are now
involved in the Russian war effort, championing the actions of the Russian state and its army in
Ukraine. Alongside Putin, they have replaced the idea of Alexander Nevsky as a diplomat with
that of a warrior-saint and embody this change in their own words and actions, too.
While Alexander Nevsky has not been explicitly invoked as part of the war effort, it will
be interesting to see if he will be as the war progresses. Already, there is a class of submarine,
the K-550, which is named after Nevsky, providing an opportunity for Putin and his government
to invoke the larger idea of Nevsky in the war. Furthermore, with films like Eisenstein’s
Alexander Nevsky promoting the idea of Russia against the Nazis, it would be easy to adopt this
film into the narrative of de-Nazifiying Ukraine. Only time will tell what Alexander Nevsky will
be used for next, but, for now at least, he remains a warrior-saint in the narrative of Putin’s
Russia.
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